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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
IS HONOR TANGIBLE PROPERTY?  
James Santiago* 
United States Marine Corps Sergeant Dakota Meyer said, 
“When they told me that I would be receiving the Medal of Honor 
I told them that I didn’t want it, because I don’t feel like a 
hero.”1 This statement reflects the feelings of many real war 
heroes who deserve and are given recognition yet feel that they 
are unworthy of such accolades. Unfortunately, there are also 
individuals who want the recognition of being a war hero but lie 
about having served. Nevertheless, the First Amendment will 
continue to guarantee the freedom of speech of those who lie 
about unearned military honors unless the government can 
establish a compelling interest and pass narrowly tailored 
legislation to effectuate that interest. In this context, the 
compelling government interest is to protect tangible benefits for 
veterans from people who lie about military service in an attempt 
to falsely obtain those benefits. Although there are a limited 
number of permissible content-based restrictions under the First 
Amendment—inciting imminent lawless action, defamation, 
speech integral to criminal conduct, child pornography, and 
actual threats2—false statements about military awards are not 
included on that list.3 With that in mind, the Supreme Court held 
in United States v. Alvarez that the Stolen Valor Act of 
2005,4 which made it a crime for anyone to make false claims 
about receipt of military decorations or medals, was an 
unconstitutional infringement on protected First Amendment 
speech.5 Both the Senate and the House, in response to the ruling, 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. David Martin, Bearing Both the Medal of Honor and Trauma, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27,
2012, 9:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3445_162-57518386/bearing-both-the-medal-
of-honor-and-trauma/. 
2. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion).
3. See id. 
4. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
5. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551.
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proposed amending legislation to the Stolen Valor Act.6 Each 
amending bill has its own advantages and disadvantages, but a 
more refined combination of the two bills will be necessary in 
order for a new Act to be effective and constitutional. 
In a concurring opinion in Alvarez, Justice Breyer suggested 
that the Stolen Valor Act might survive if it were narrower in 
scope and not overly restrictive of protected speech.7 That is, it 
may pass constitutional muster if it were more narrowly tailored 
to achieve the government’s compelling interest of protecting the 
tangible benefits for service members. An example of this type of 
narrower legislation is a statute passed in response to the Court’s 
holding in Snyder v. Phelps.8 In Snyder, the Court held that 
protestors from the Westboro Baptist Church, who picket military 
funerals because they believe that God hates the United States for 
its tolerance of homosexuality, are entitled to First Amendment 
protection during these protests.9 In response, the government 
enacted a law that imposed restrictions on the location and times 
of protests, requiring that protests be at least 300 feet away from 
and two hours before or after funeral services.10 Although this 
statute’s constitutionality has not been tested, the law does address 
the concern of how to protect freedom of speech while 
simultaneously limiting inflammatory speech with restrictions 
that are narrow in scope. The Alvarez Court was similarly 
concerned about the Stolen Valor Act’s overly broad restrictions 
on the freedom of speech in the form of its potential application 
to “limitless times and settings.”11 Congress should amend the 
Stolen Valor Act to narrowly serve the compelling interest of 
protecting tangible benefits for veterans by singling out for 
criminalization the most harmful instances of lying about military 
awards and service. This revision will parallel the narrow tailoring 
achieved in the post–Snyder statute. 
Both of the proposed bills would limit the Stolen Valor Act to 
cover only cases of lying with a prerequisite intent, namely when 
6. Military Service Integrity Act of 2012, S. 3372, 112th Cong. (2012); Stolen Valor
Act of 2012, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. (2012). 
7. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring).
8. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
9. Id. at 1213, 1220.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1388.
11. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547.
2013 Is Honor Tangible Property? 111 
someone tries to gain a tangible benefit.12 This is an important 
qualification because it helps to narrowly tailor the Act to serve 
the compelling government interest at issue: protecting tangible 
benefits for veterans. It also addresses the hypothetical of whether 
or not someone in a theatrical performance—whose speech falls 
within the statute’s purview—could be charged with a crime, an 
example commentators employ to show the tailoring problems 
the Act faces.13 
In the Senate bill, 
 [T]angible benefit or personal gain includes 
(A) a benefit relating to military service provided by 
the Federal Government or a State or local 
government; 
(B) employment or professional advancement; 
(C) financial remuneration; 
(D) an effect on the outcome of a criminal or civil 
court proceeding; and 
(E) an impact on one’s personal credibility in a political 
campaign.14 
This list places limits on the degree to which the government 
can restrict freedom of speech, but “includes” could be open to 
interpretation as to whether or not this list is exhaustive. This 
potential over-inclusiveness is problematic for narrow tailoring 
because it may inadvertently include benefits beyond those 
enumerated and raise the aforementioned concern of restrictions 
extending to ‘limitless times and settings.’ The list is also 
potentially under-inclusive because it could be interpreted to not 
12. Military Service Integrity Act of 2012, S. 3372, 112th Cong. (2012); Stolen Valor
Act of 2012, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. (2012). 
13. See Joshua J. Orewiler, Stolen Valor and Freedom of Speech: An Analysis of How 
Federal Law Should Criminalize the Wearing of Unearned Military Awards, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 1811, 1814 (2012) (discussing how courts may have different interpretations of 
whether or not there is a violation of the Stolen Valor Act when an actor wears a military 
award in a movie). 
14. S. 3372.
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cover some important tangible benefits, a deficiency which defeats 
the statute’s purpose. For example, one may lie about military 
service because of its potential to be counted as a plus factor in 
academic admissions. Admission to an institution of higher 
learning is one example of a tangible benefit that could be read to 
lay outside the statute’s purview. Hence, lying about military 
service for improving one’s admissions prospects should be 
included under this list because of the benefit’s similarity to 
employment or professional advancement.15 
 Compared to the Senate bill, the House bill has a potentially 
more expansive definition of tangible benefit, which could be read 
to include tangible benefits like improved chances of admission. 
The House bill would make it a crime to lie about a military 
award in order to receive “money, property, or [some] other 
tangible benefit,” leaving tangible benefit undefined.16 Again, this 
potential over-inclusiveness poses problems for narrow tailoring. 
Additionally, the House bill is more restrictive than the Senate bill 
in one important aspect. The House bill only addresses false 
representations about military decorations and medals17 while the 
Senate bill includes false representations about military 
decorations, medals, and military service.18 This aspect of the 
House bill is under-inclusive because it does not cover something 
that many veteran’s take great pride in: their military service.  
A combination of the two bills, one that includes military 
service as well as a specific and definitive list of tangible benefits, 
should be adopted because it would protect the tangible benefits 
owed to service members in a way that is constitutional. The 
original law had bipartisan support because it protected a 
sympathetic group, with the added benefit that enforcement of the 
law would be relatively cost-free for the government.19 It is likely 
15. See UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 2012–2013 APPLICATION FOR FRESHMAN
UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS, at
7, available at http://www.admissions.umich.edu/drupal/first-year-students (providing the 
option for applicants to indicate veteran status along with racial and ethnic 
information). See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (permitting 
university admissions offices to consider race as a plus factor in an individualized holistic 




19. Ramya Kasturi, Note, Stolen Valor: A Historical Perspective on the Regulation of 
Military Uniform and Decorations, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 419, 437–38 (2012). 
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that a combination of these two popular bills into a narrowly 
tailored law that includes an element of intent to state false claims 
in order to gain a tangible benefit would also gain bipartisan 
support in response to the Alvarez ruling. 
Although both proposed bills were reactions to the Court’s 
ruling and were attempts to save the Stolen Valor Act, neither 
seems to fully capture the original law’s intent; the bills protect 
property but not intangible assets such as honor. Hence, in 
addition to the refined version proposed to ensure the bill’s 
constitutionality, public action will be necessary to protect service 
members’ honor. The best way to enforce the true spirit of the law 
would be through what the Alvarez plurality referred to as 
“counterspeech,”20 where an informed public can outweigh 
misrepresentations by using the public’s free speech, be it via the 
media or a simple protest, to expose any falsehoods; this 
counterspeech can be enabled by reference to an accurate national 
registry of all military personnel and awards. The Federal 
Government has argued that such a registry would be impractical 
and incomplete,21 but all the necessary pieces are in place for easy 
implementation. Every separating and retiring service member is 
given discharge paperwork that documents length of service as 
well as awards.22 This document is already required as proof for 
Veterans Affairs benefits and some government 
employment.23Additionally, some non-government entities, such 
as institutions of higher learning, already may request discharge 
documentation.24 The creation of a registry does not mean that a 
service member should always be required to produce 
documentation containing a great deal of privileged information, 
but it is one mechanism by which the public can verify someone’s 
claims and hold him or her accountable. 
There are already ways to confirm someone’s military service, 
20. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality opinion).
21. See id. at 2551.
22. See Veterans Service Records, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/veterans/military-service-records/ (last visited Nov. 14, 
2012). 
23. See, e.g., Eligibility for the VA Home Loan Program, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.benefits.va.gov/homeloans/eligibility.asp. 
24. See, e.g., $1,000 Scholarship Available to
any OIF/OEF Veteran/Military/Spouse!, U-M STUDENT VETERANS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 
http://vets.umich.edu/content/1000-scholarship-available-any-oifoef-veteranmilitaryspouse 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
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especially when tangible benefits are involved, but if the Stolen 
Valor Act’s goal is to protect soldiers’ intangible valor by 
preventing those who did not serve from receiving benefits as if 
they did, then it will have to be the responsibility of an informed 
public to be vigilant. This dual reform—a revised statute and a 
national registry—will ensure both the Stolen Valor Act’s 
constitutionality and the advancement of its principal goal. 
Indeed, regardless of whether or not the amendments are enacted 
or subsequently found to be unconstitutional, it should ultimately 
be a civic duty to uphold the values that the law attempts to 
protect. 
